Kant and Therapeutic Privilege
National University of Singapore, Singapore
Address correspondence to: Chris Brown, National University of Singapore, Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Arts and Sciences, 3 Arts Link, Singapore 117570. E-mail: cabrown{at}u.arizona.edu.
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Given Kant's exceptionless moral prohibition on lying, one might suspect that he is committed to a similar prohibition on withholding diagnostic and prognostic information from patients. I confirm this suspicion by adapting arguments against therapeutic privilege from his arguments against lying. However, I show that all these arguments are importantly flawed and submit that they should be rejected. A more compelling Kantian take on informed consent and therapeutic privilege is achievable, I argue, by focusing on Kant's duty of beneficence, which requires us to aim at furthering others ends. But I show that there are some cases in which furthering a patient's ends requires withholding material medical information from her. Although I concede that these cases are probably quite rare, I conclude that the best Kantian thinking agrees with that of therapeutic privilege's advocates.
Keywords: informed consent, Kant, lying, therapeutic privilege
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