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Journal of Medicine and Philosophy Advance Access originally published online on February 24, 2009
Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 2009 34(2):102-118; doi:10.1093/jmp/jhp014
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© The Author 2009. Published by Oxford University Press, on behalf of the Journal of Medicine and Philosophy Inc. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org

Therapeutic Cloning and Reproductive Liberty

Robert Sparrow

Monash University, Clayton, Victoria, Australia

Address correspondence to: Robert Sparrow, PhD, Centre for Human Bioethics, Monash University, Clayton, Victoria 3800, Australia. E-mail: Robert.Sparrow{at}arts.monash.edu.au


  Abstract

Concern for "reproductive liberty" suggests that decisions about embryos should normally be made by the persons who would be the genetic parents of the child that would be brought into existence if the embryo were brought to term. Therapeutic cloning would involve creating and destroying an embryo, which, if brought to term, would be the offspring of the genetic parents of the person undergoing therapy. I argue that central arguments in debates about parenthood and genetics therefore suggest that therapeutic cloning would be prima facie unethical unless it occurred with the consent of the parents of the person being cloned. Alternatively, if therapeutic cloning is thought to be legitimate, this undermines the case for some uses of reproductive cloning by implying that the genetic relation it establishes between clones and DNA donors does not carry the same moral weight as it does in cases of normal reproduction.

Keywords: genetic relatedness, parenthood, reproductive liberty, stem cells, therapeutic cloning


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Introduction
J Med Philos, April 1, 2009; 34(2): 93 - 101.
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