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Journal of Medicine and Philosophy Advance Access originally published online on February 27, 2009
Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 2009 34(2):135-154; doi:10.1093/jmp/jhp016
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© The Author 2009. Published by Oxford University Press, on behalf of the Journal of Medicine and Philosophy Inc. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org

Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis, Reproductive Freedom, and Deliberative Democracy

Colin Farrelly

Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, Canada

Address correspondence to: Colin Farrelly, PhD, Department of Political Studies, Queen's University, Kingston, ON, Canada K7L 3N6. E-mail: farrelly{at}queensu.ca


  Abstract

In this paper I argue that the account of deliberative democracy advanced by Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson (1996, 2004) is a useful normative theory that can help enhance our deliberations about public policy in morally pluralistic societies. More specifically, I illustrate how the prescriptions of deliberative democracy can be applied to the issue of regulating non-medical uses of pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD), such as gender selection. Deliberative democracy does not aim to win a philosophical debate among rival first-order theories, such as libertarianism, egalitarianism or feminism. Rather, it advances a second-order analysis that strives to help us determine what would constitute a reasonable balance between the conflicting fundamental values that arise in the context of regulating PGD. I outline a theoretical model (called the Reasonable Genetic Intervention Model) that brings these issues to the fore. Such a model incorporates the concern for both procedural and substantive principles; and it does so in way that takes provisionality seriously.

Keywords: deliberative democracy, gender selection, pre-implantation genetic diagnosis, reproductive freedom


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Introduction
J Med Philos, April 1, 2009; 34(2): 93 - 101.
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