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Journal of Medicine and Philosophy Advance Access originally published online on August 19, 2009
Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 2009 34(5):470-486; doi:10.1093/jmp/jhp035
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© The Author 2009. Published by Oxford University Press, on behalf of the Journal of Medicine and Philosophy Inc. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org

Metaphysical and Ethical Perspectives on Creating Animal-Human Chimeras

Jason T. Eberl

Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis, Indianapolis, Indiana, USA

Rebecca A. Ballard

Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis, Indianapolis, Indiana, USA

Address correspondence to: Jason T. Eberl, PhD, Department of Philosophy, Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis, 425 University Blvd., CA 331, Indianapolis, IN 46202, USA. E-mail: jeberl{at}iupui.edu


  Abstract

This paper addresses several questions related to the nature, production, and use of animal-human (a-h) chimeras. At the heart of the issue is whether certain types of a-h chimeras should be brought into existence, and, if they are, how we should treat such creatures. In our current research environment, we recognize a dichotomy between research involving nonhuman animal subjects and research involving human subjects, and the classification of a research protocol into one of these categories will trigger different ethical standards as to the moral permissibility of the research in question. Are a-h chimeras entitled to the more restrictive and protective ethical standards applied to human research subjects? We elucidate an Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysical framework in which to argue how such chimeras ought to be defined ontologically. We then examine when the creation of, and experimentation upon, certain types of a-h chimeras may be morally permissible.

Keywords: Aquinas, chimera, hybrid, personhood, potentiality


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