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Journal of Medicine and Philosophy Advance Access originally published online on October 30, 2009
Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 2009 34(6):552-572; doi:10.1093/jmp/jhp045
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© The Author 2009. Published by Oxford University Press, on behalf of the Journal of Medicine and Philosophy Inc. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org

A Litmus Test for Exploitation: James Stacey Taylor's Stakes and Kidneys

J. R. Kuntz

The University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK

Address correspondence to: J. R. Kuntz, MA, Philosophy in PPLS, University of Edinburgh, Dugald Stewart Building, 3 Charles Street, Rm 1.06, Edinburgh EH8 9AD, UK. E-mail: j.r.kuntz{at}sms.ed.ac.uk


  Abstract

James Stacy Taylor advances a thorough argument for the legalization of markets in current (live) human kidneys. The market is seemly the most abhorrent type of market, a market where the least well-off sell part of their body to the most well off. Though rigorously defended overall, his arguments concerning exploitation are thin. I examine a number of prominent bioethicists’ account of exploitation: most importantly, Ruth Sample's exploitation as degradation. I do so in the context of Taylor's argument, with the aim of buttressing Taylor's position that a regulated kidney market is morally allowable. I argue that Sample fails to provide normative grounds consistent with her claim that exploitation is wrong. I then reformulate her account for consistency and plausibility. Still, this seemingly more plausible view does not show that Taylor's regulated kidney market is prohibitively exploitative of impoverished persons. I tack into place one more piece of support for Taylor's conclusion. (wc. 148)

Keywords: commodification, ethics, J. S. Taylor, kidneys, organ markets


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