Skip Navigation

Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 2008 33(1):27-43; doi:10.1093/jmp/jhm006
This Article
Right arrow Full Text
Right arrow Full Text (PDF)
Right arrow Alert me when this article is cited
Right arrow Alert me if a correction is posted
Services
Right arrow Email this article to a friend
Right arrow Similar articles in this journal
Right arrow Similar articles in PubMed
Right arrow Alert me to new issues of the journal
Right arrow Add to My Personal Archive
Right arrow Download to citation manager
Right arrowRequest Permissions
Google Scholar
Right arrow Articles by Rentmeester, C. A.
Right arrow Search for Related Content
PubMed
Right arrow PubMed Citation
Right arrow Articles by Rentmeester, C. A.
Social Bookmarking
 Add to CiteULike   Add to Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us  
What's this?

© The Author 2008. Published by Oxford University Press, on behalf of the Journal of Medicine and Philosophy Inc. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org

Moral Damage to Health Care Professionals and Trainees: Legalism and other Consequences for Patients and Colleagues

Christy A. Rentmeester

Creighton University, Omaha, Nebraska, USA

Address correspondence to: Christy A. Rentmeester, PhD, Center for Health Policy and Ethics, Creighton University, 2500 California Plaza, Chpe 202, Omaha, NE 68178, USA. E-mail: ChristyRentmeester{at}creighton.edu.


   Abstract

Health care professionals’ and trainees’ conceptions of their responsibilities to patients can change over time for a number of reasons: evolving career goals, desires to serve different patient populations, and changing family obligations, for example. Some changes in conceptions of responsibility are healthy, but others express moral damage. Clinicians’ changes in their conceptions of what they are responsible for express moral damage when their responses to others express a meager, rather than robust, sense of what they owe others. At least two important expressions of moral damage in the context of health care are these: callousness and divestiture. Callousness describes the poor condition of a clinician's capacity for moral perception; when her capacity to accurately appreciate features of moral relevance that configure others’ needs, vulnerabilities, and desert of care diminishes, such that she fails to respond with care to those for whom she has duties to care, she is callous. Callousness has been explored in detail elsewhere,1 and so the focus of this paper is divestiture. A clinician divests when the value of responding with care to others becomes less centrally and importantly constitutive of his personal and professional identity. Divestiture has important consequences for patients and health professions education, which I will explore here.

Keywords: callousness, clinical moral perception, legalism, moral damage, professionlism


Add to CiteULike CiteULike   Add to Connotea Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us Del.icio.us    What's this?




Disclaimer: Please note that abstracts for content published before 1996 were created through digital scanning and may therefore not exactly replicate the text of the original print issues. All efforts have been made to ensure accuracy, but the Publisher will not be held responsible for any remaining inaccuracies. If you require any further clarification, please contact our Customer Services Department.