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Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 2008 33(4):302-320; doi:10.1093/jmp/jhn013
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© The Author 2008. Published by Oxford University Press, on behalf of the Journal of Medicine and Philosophy Inc. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org

Epistemic Trust, Epistemic Responsibility, and Medical Practice

Abraham P. Schwab

Brooklyn College, Brooklyn, New York, USA

Address correspondence to: Abraham P. Schwab, Department of Philosophy, Brooklyn College of The City University of New York, 2900 Bedford Avenue, Brooklyn, NY 11210-2889, USA. E-mail: aschwab{at}brooklyn.cuny.edu


  Abstract

Epistemic trust is an unacknowledged feature of medical knowledge. Claims of medical knowledge made by physicians, patients, and others require epistemic trust. And yet, it would be foolish to define all epistemic trust as epistemically responsible. Accordingly, I use a routine example in medical practice (a diagnostic test) to illustrate how epistemically responsible trust in medicine is trust in epistemically responsible individuals. I go on to illustrate how certain areas of current medical practice of medicine fall short of adequately distinguishing reliable and unreliable processes because of a failure to systematically evaluate health outcomes. I conclude by articulating the devastating obstacles to the consilience assumption, which takes intellectual character (rather than reliable belief-forming processes) as the standard for epistemic responsibility.

Keywords: epistemic responsibility, reliabilism, trust


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Introduction
J Med Philos, August 1, 2008; 33(4): 295 - 301.
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