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Journal of Medicine and Philosophy Advance Access originally published online on December 24, 2008
Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 2008 33(6):609-634; doi:10.1093/jmp/jhn031
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© The Author 2008. Published by Oxford University Press, on behalf of the Journal of Medicine and Philosophy Inc. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org

A Defining Analysis of the Life and Death Dyad: Paving the Way for an Ethical Debate

Giovanni Boniolo

IFOM, Firc Institute of Molecular Oncology, Milan, Italy; Dipartimento di Medicina, Chirurgia ed Odontoiatria, University of Milano, Milano, Italy

Pier Paolo Di Fiore

Dipartimento di Medicina, Chirurgia ed Odontoiatria, University of Milano, Milano, Italy; IFOM, Firc Institute of Molecular Oncology, Milan, Italy

Address correspondence to: Giovanni Boniolo, IFOM, Firc Institute of Molecular Oncology, Via Adamello 16, 20139 Milan, Italy. E-mail: giovanni.boniolo{at}ifom-ieo-campus.it


  Abstract

We discuss the meaning of "being alive" and "being dead." Our primary aim is to pave the way for a sound and accurate ethical debate concerning these two concepts. In particular, we analyze a metabolic approach and a genetic one and discuss the reasons for their failure to constitute a good starting point for successive debates. We argue that any ethical or social discussion of topics involving life and death must introduce cultural constructs such as, on the one hand, the concept of clinical death and, on the other hand, the concept of existence. We argue that these two cultural constructs, although consistent with biomedical knowledge, cannot be ontologically grounded in it. To conclude, we apply our findings to the case of human embryos.

Keywords: clinical death, death, embryo, existence, gene, life, metabolism


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A. E. Hinkley
"How Are We Defining Our Terms Here?": The Defining the Semantic Meaning of Terms in Bioethical Debates
J Med Philos, January 15, 2009; (2009) jhn034v1.
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