Skip Navigation


Journal of Medicine and Philosophy Advance Access originally published online on February 4, 2009
Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 2009 34(1):6-26; doi:10.1093/jmp/jhn038
This Article
Right arrow Full Text
Right arrow Full Text (PDF)
Right arrow All Versions of this Article:
34/1/6    most recent
jhn038v1
Right arrow Alert me when this article is cited
Right arrow Alert me if a correction is posted
Services
Right arrow Email this article to a friend
Right arrow Similar articles in this journal
Right arrow Similar articles in PubMed
Right arrow Alert me to new issues of the journal
Right arrow Add to My Personal Archive
Right arrow Download to citation manager
Right arrowRequest Permissions
Google Scholar
Right arrow Articles by kahane, G.
Right arrow Articles by Savulescu, J.
Right arrow Search for Related Content
PubMed
Right arrow PubMed Citation
Right arrow Articles by kahane, G.
Right arrow Articles by Savulescu, J.
Social Bookmarking
Add to CiteULike   Add to Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us  
What's this?

© The Author 2009. Published by Oxford University Press, on behalf of the Journal of Medicine and Philosophy Inc. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org

Brain Damage and the Moral Significance of Consciousness

Guy kahane

University of Oxford, Oxford, UK

Julian Savulescu

University of Oxford, Oxford, UK

Address correspondence to: Prof. Julian Savulescu, Director, Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, University of Oxford, Littlegate House, St Ebbes Street, Oxford OX1 1PT, UK. E-mail: julian.savulescu{at}philosophy.ox.ac.uk


  Abstract

Neuroimaging studies of brain-damaged patients diagnosed as in the vegetative state suggest that the patients might be conscious. This might seem to raise no new ethical questions given that in related disputes both sides agree that evidence for consciousness gives strong reason to preserve life. We question this assumption. We clarify the widely held but obscure principle that consciousness is morally significant. It is hard to apply this principle to difficult cases given that philosophers of mind distinguish between a range of notions of consciousness and that is unclear which of these is assumed by the principle. We suggest that the morally relevant notion is that of phenomenal consciousness and then use our analysis to interpret cases of brain damage. We argue that enjoyment of consciousness might actually give stronger moral reasons not to preserve a patient's life and, indeed, that these might be stronger when patients retain significant cognitive function.

Keywords: brain-imaging, consciousness, minimally conscious state, termination of treatment, vegetative state


Add to CiteULike CiteULike   Add to Connotea Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us Del.icio.us    What's this?


This article has been cited by other articles:


Home page
 J. Med. EthicsHome page
D J Wilkinson, G Kahane, M Horne, and J Savulescu
Functional neuroimaging and withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment from vegetative patients
J. Med. Ethics, August 1, 2009; 35(8): 508 - 511.
[Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]

Home page
 J Med PhilosHome page
L. B. McCullough
Tracking the Variability of Authority and Power in the Physician-Patient Relationship
J Med Philos, February 1, 2009; 34(1): 1 - 5.
[Full Text] [PDF]


Disclaimer: Please note that abstracts for content published before 1996 were created through digital scanning and may therefore not exactly replicate the text of the original print issues. All efforts have been made to ensure accuracy, but the Publisher will not be held responsible for any remaining inaccuracies. If you require any further clarification, please contact our Customer Services Department.